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JUDICIAL SELECTION AND POLITICAL CULTURE
JONATHAN L. ENTIN•

The 2000 election campaign for the seat- held by Ohio Supreme Court
Justice Alice Robie Resnick was by far the most contentious in the Buckeye
State's history. Justice Resnick, part of the four-member majority on a court
that had decided a number of high-stakes cases, was targeted for defeat by
business groups, notably the state and national Chambers of Commerce. •
Millions of dollars poured into the campaign, much of it devoted to television
advertisements accusing Justice Resnick of selling her judicial vote to trial
lawyers and labor unions. 2 The tone of the campaign was so vitriolic that Chief
Justice Thomas J. Moyer, who regularly dissented from the controversial
rulings, urged disclosure of advertising sponsors in the future and the adoption
of an appointive system in place of judicial elections. 3 The Ohio campaign was
the latest in a series of highly contentious state judicial elections in recent
years.• For example, in 1986 California's Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of
her colleagues were ousted after a campaign that focused on the trio's
decisions in death penalty cases.~ Then in 1996, Nebraska Chief Justice David
Copyriglll «:1 2001. Jonothnn L Emin.

Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. My
father's fin~ illness prevented me from delivering this paper in person at the Capital University
Law School symposium on judicial selection in January 200 I. My deepest gratitude goes to the
editors who have permitted me to participate vicariously in the proceedings.
1
T.C. Brown, 2 Campaigns for Top Court Exceed $6 Million: Spending, Auack Ads
Some of Worst in Coumry, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 27,2000, at Bl.
2
/d.; William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts,N. Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at AI. One advertisement that aired repeatedly showed the traditional
scales of justice with a voice-over saying, "Is justice for sale in Ohio?" James Bradshaw, Ad
Signals Tough Fight for Ohio Supreme Court Seat, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 2000, at C6;
Spencer Hunt, Campaign 2000-TV Ads Help Mold Supreme Coun Race, CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct.
22, 2000, at B I; Sandy Theis. Controversial Ad Becomes Issue in Court Race, PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 21,2000, at5B.
3
James Bradshaw, Select, Don't Elect, Moyer Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 10,
2000. at 86; T.C. Brown, Moyer Urges Appointing of Top Court, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 10,
2000, at BI; T.C. Brown, Top Judge Wants Ad Campaign Backers Identified, PLAIN DEALER,
Dec. 12,2000, at B5; Spencer Hunt, Campaign Secrecy to Face Attack, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec.
12, 2000, at B I; Spencer Hunt, Chief Justice; Appoint Judges, CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov. 10,2000,
at Cl.
4
Glaberson, supra note 2, at A I.
5
See generally PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND
TilE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT {1981); see also RobertS. Thompson, Judicial Retention
Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of /986,
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Lanphier lost his seat after writing a unanimous opinion that invalidated a
term-limits amendment to the state constitution," and Justice Penny White of
the Tennessee Supreme Court was defeated largely on the basis of her joining
an opinion overturning the death penalty in a notorious rape and murder case. 7
Meanwhile, Alabama has had a series of tumultuous supreme court election
campaigns over the past decade.• In short, the Resnick campaign reflected the
increasing involvement of interest groups in judicial elections and the
escalation of the cost of those elections.• Chief Justice Moyer's reform
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988).
6
Duggan v. Beermann, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1994} (holding-that sponsors of the
amendment, which had been approved in the 1992 general election, submitted an insufficient
number of valid signatures on their initiative petition so the amendment was void). Opposition
to Lanphier also arose from several rulings overturning second-degree murder convictions.
Tracie! V. Reid, The Politicization ofRetention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat ofJustices
Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70-71 (1999}.
7
State v. Odom, 928 S. W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). The court unanimously concluded that
errors during the trial's penalty phase required a new sentencing hearing, id. at 32-33, although
two of the five justices based their conclusion on narrower grounds than did the majority./d. at
33-35 (Anderson, C.J., joined by Drowota, J., concurring and dissenting). On the sources of
opposition to Justice White, see Reid, supra note 6, at 70.
8
See generally Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Elections: A Case Study
of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & PoL. 645,656-61 (1999}. The 1994 election for
chief justice was not decided for nearly a year due to a dispute over counting absentee ballots.
Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995). In 2000, the voters chose Roy Moore as their
new chief justice. Other Races itzthe South: "Ten Commandments Judge" Elected to Lead
Alabama High Court, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., Nov. 8, 2000, at E12. Moore was a trial judge
who gained notoriety by displaying the Ten Commandments in his courtroom. /d. When his
display prompted litigation, the Governor threatened to call out the National Guard to keep the
Ten Commandments on view, but the legal dispute ended inconclusively. See Ala. Freethought
Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1995)(concludingthattheplaintiffschallenging
Judge Moore's display of the Ten Commandments lacked standing); Ex parte Moore, 773 So.
2d 437(Aia. 2000) (per curiam) (dismissing as moot Judge Moore's challenge to the Alabama
Judicial Inquiry Commission's investigation relating to the controversy over his display of the
Ten Commandments in his courtroom); Ex parte State ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So. 2d 952
(Ala. 1998) (finding the dispute over Judge Moore's display of the Ten Commandments to be
nonjusticiable); cf Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that
courtroom display of the Ten Commandments violates the Establishment Clause), affd, 15
F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). Chief Justice Moore recently had a
massive sculpture containing the Ten C~mmandments installed in the rotunda of the Alabama
Supreme Court building. Jeffrey Gettleman, Conviction Cast in Stone, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2001, at A9; Dahleen Glanton, Judge Unveils Bible-Based Monument, CHI. TRJB., Aug. 16,
2001, at I.
9
See generally Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LoY.
(continued)
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proposals mirror ideas that have received nationwide support.
This article examines the background to the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court
election and suggests that the contention surrounding Justice Resnick's
reelection bid arose less from the state's method of choosing judges than from
a political culture that places substantial weight on judicial philosophy and
case outcomes. If legal doctrine is politically salient, those who care about the
law will seek to influence the composition of the judiciary. This in tum
counsels against unrealistic expectations about refonn of the judicial selection
process. Things may improve at the margin, but the most likely check on the
worst excesses might well be the difficulty of sustaining a slash-and-bum
political strategy at least in the-judicial context. After all, Justice Resnick did
win despite the heavy artillery she faced last year} 1
This article proceeds in four stages. Part I examines the major rulings,
relating to tort refonn and school funding, that prompted the harsh and
expensive Ohio campaign. Part n compares the process for appointing federal
judges, particularly Supreme Court justices, which has also become notably
contentious over the past three decades. Part III discusses the trend away from
strict limitations on campaign speech by judicial candidates, which combined
with the expansive protections afforded to independent expenditures in
election campaigns will facilitate sharp rhetoric by those inclined in that
direction. Finally, Part IV assesses the prospects for elevating the level of
discourse in judicial selection.
10

I.

THE UNDERLYING ISSUES IN THE 2000 OHIO SUPREME COURT
ELECTION

Two major issues galvanized interest group involvement in· Justice
Resnick's reelection campaign. 12 One was tort refonn, the other school
funding. 1' During the year preceding the November 2000 election, Resnick
wrote the majority opinion in important cases dealing with both subjects.'"
Both times the Ohio Supreme Court was divided four to three so that electoral
L.A. L. REV. 1391 (2001); Glaberson, supra note 2.
10
William Glaberson, A Bipartisan Effort to Remove Politics from Judicial Races, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at A 18; William Glaberson, Justices Urge Stricter Rules for Judicial
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at A 16; William Glaberso'n, Lawyers' Study Says States
Should Pay for Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 200 I, at A 10; William Glaberson, States
Taking Steps to Rein In Excesses of Judicial Politicking, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,2001, at AI.
11
James Bradshaw, High Court Unchanged Despite Negative TV Ads, COLUMBUS
D1SPA TCH, Nov. 8, 2000, at A I.
12
Ken McCall, Resnick Preparing for Fight ofHer Life, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 27,
2000, at AI.
13

/d.

14
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); State ex rei. Ohio Acad. of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
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fate might well have determined the direction of legal doctrine in the state on
these and similar issues.'' This section examines Justice Resnick's opinions in
the high-profile cases that became the focus of the campaign debate. Although
those opinions were open to criticism, her most strident opponents in the
business community obscured the real analytical difficulties in ways that
helped her galvanize support and win reelection.
A. Tort Reform
Between 1975 and 1987, the Ohio General Assembly enacted several
measures designed to make it more difficult for tort plaintiffs to recover and
limiting how much they could receive.'• Beginning in 1986, the Ohio Supreme
Court invalidated some of the central provisions of the new laws for violating
the state constitution.
Many of these rulings concerned the time within which medical
malpractice actions must be filed The legislature set a one-year statute of
limitations accompanied by a four-year statute of repose.' 7 This meant that all
malpractice claims had to be brought within one year after the plaintiff
discovered the injury, but in any event within four years of the occurrence of
the alleged malpractice.'" The court incrementally gutted these requirements in
a series of rulings.,. First to go was the statute of repose as applied to minors
below the age of ten. 2" The malpractice law tolled the time limits for only four
years. 21 This would prevent a child injured before her tenth birthday from
suing in her own right because the four-year statute of repose would expire
before she turned eighteen. 22 Denying the right to sue contravened the due
course of law provision of the Ohio Constitution. 23 Soon afterward the court
rejected the statute of repose as applied to plaintiffs who did not discover their
injuries within the four-year deadline.,. This restriction contravened the state

15
Justice Deborah L. Cook, who dissented in the contentious cases, was also up for
reelection but was generally expected to win another term. William Glaberson, A Spirited
Campaign for Ohio Court Puts Judges on New Terrain, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at A 15.
16
The most important of these were the Ohio Medical Malpractice Act, 1975 Ohio
Laws 2809, and the Tort Reform Act of 1987, 1987 Ohio Laws 1661.
17
Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717,719-20 (Ohio 1986).
18
/d.
19
/d.; Hardy v. Vermenlen, 512 N.E.2d 626(0hio 1987); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland,
Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987).
20
Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at syl.
21
/d. at 721.
22
ld. Although the state had a disability statute that tolls the statute of limitations for
minors, this statute did not apply to malpractice claims. ld.
23
/d. at 722; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
24
Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at syl.
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constitutional right to remedy for personal injury.
Next came a ruling
striking down the statute of repose as applied to a plaintiff who discovered her
injury in the fourth year after the occurrence of the alleged malpractice. 26
Enforcing the statute of repose would give such a plaintiff less than one full
year to prepare her case before filing suit, but the one-year· statute of
limitations showed that the legislature intended malpractice plaintiffs to have
that long to go to court. 21 The statutory distinction between those claimants
who discovered their medical injuries in time to file within one year and those
who discovered their medical injuries less than a year before the expiration of
the statute of repose violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal
protection because there was no rational basis for the distinction."
Other procedural restrictions met a similar fate based on the separation of
powers. 29 First down was a statutory ban on including a specific amount of
damages in the complaint when the plaintiff sought more than $25,000. 30 This
ban conflicted with a procedural rule promulgated by the court that required
plaintiffs to specify the amount of damages they sought. 31 Because the state
constitution empowered the supreme court to "prescribe rules governing
practice and procedure in all courts,"32 the procedural rule trumped an
inconsistent statute. 33 The same reasoning led to the demise of an additional
pleading requirement for malpractice plaintiffs. 34 The malpractice statute
mandated that complaints document that the plaintiff or her lawyer had sought
to examine or copy the patient's medical records before filing suit. 35 This
statutory requirement conflicted With another procedural rule that contained no
provision for affidavits or other verification in malpractice pleadings, so the
inconsistent statute had to fall. 36
25

/d. at629.
Gaines v. Preterm-Cieveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, syl. (Ohio 1987).
27
/d. at 714.
28
/d. at 714-15; OHIO CaNST. art I, §2. The court added that affording malpractice
claimants less than a full year to sue after discovering their injuries violated the open courts
provision. 514 N.E.2d at716; OHIOCONST. art. I, §16.
29
Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994); Rockey v. 84 Lumber
Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).
30
Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at syl. The statutory provision applied to all tort actions, not
only to malpractiCe claims. /d. at 790. Although Rockey was an ordinary personal injury suit,
two of the consolidated cases challenging the provision involved medical malpractice claims.
/d. at 789, 792-93.
31
/d. at 791-92.
32
OHIOCONST. art. IV,§ 5(B).
33
Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 792.
34
Hiall, 626 N.E.2d at syl.
35
/d. at 72-73.
36
/d. at 73.
25

26
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The legislature did not confine itself to procedural barriers. ' The
malpractice statute also imposed restrictions on damages, but the court did
away with those as well. 3" The ceiling of $200,000 on general damages was
first to go. 3• Although the cap was promoted as a way to address the crisis in
medical malpractice insurance, the majority found no rational connection
between general damage awards and malpractice insurance rates.'"
Accordingly, the cap violated the Ohio constitutional guarantee of due process·
of laW. 41 Then came a ruling that overturned a provision requiring that
malpractice damages in excess of $200,000 be paid periodically rather than in
a lump sum. 42 This requirement could result in a successful plaintiffs receiving
less than the full amount of the verdict, which violated the state constitutional
right to a jury trial. 43
The court took a similarly skeptical view of tort reform in general." Having
effectively dispatched the malpractice statute of repose, the justices struck
down a ten-year statute of repose for architects and engineers. 45 That deadline
could prevent persons injured as a result of negligent design or construction
from obtaining relief from those responsible for their injuries and therefore
violated Ohio's constitutional right to remedy:• This ruling relied heavily on
an earlier decision invalidating a two-year statute of limitations for plaintiffs
exposed to diethylstilbestrol (DES)." That case involved a provision that
triggered the statute of limitations when a woman learned from a physician that
3

37
SeeGalayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644_N.E.2d.298 (Ohio 1994); Morris v. Savoy,
576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
38
/d.
39
Morris, 576 N.E.2d at syl.
40
See id. at 770.
41
/d. at 771; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. The lead opinion, which was joined by three of
the six participating justices, also expressed concern that "the statute treat[ed] the most
seriously injured malpractice victims differently from the rest of the class [of malpractice
victims]," but concluded that the distinction passed equal protection muster under the most
deferential standard of review. /d. at 772. Two other justices thought that the damage cap
violated several state constitutional provisions, including the equal protection guarantee. /d. at
777, 778-80, 781-83 (Sweeney, J., joined by Resnick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
42
Galayda, 644 N.E.2d at syl.
43 • /d. at 301-02; OHIO CONST. art. I, §5. The periodic payment requirement also
violated the due course of law guarantee. 644 N.E.2d at 302; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
44
See Adamsky v. Buckeye Local Sch. Dist., 653 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1995); Brennaman
v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994); see also Cyrus v. Henes, 640 N.E.2d 810 (Ohio
1994).
45
Brennaman, 639 N.E.2d at syl.
46
639 N.E.2d at 430; OHIOCONST. art. I,§ 16.
47
639 N.E.2d at 430-31.
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she had an injury "which may be related" to her exposure to DES during her
mother's pregnancy:•~ Relying on the earlier decisions against unduly
restrictive time limits for filing medical malpractice actions, the majority
concluded that the DES time limit violated the right to remedy and due process
clauses of the Ohio Constitution:•. The court also held that a two-year statute
of limitations for personal injury claims against political subdivisions of the
state could not be applied to minors. 50 The law authorizing suits against
governmental entities contained no tolling provision. 51 This meant that adults
would have two years to file suit; children might never have a chance to do so
because minors may not pursue claims in court. 52 Accordingly, the two-year
limitation violated the state equal protection clause and could not bar a minor's
suit. 5)
. Other restrictions met a similar fate. For example, an effort to limit all
claims by employees against their employers to worker's compensation
proceedings was held unconstitutional. 54 Employee claims involving
intentional torts were not subject to worker's compensation because they arose
outside the employment relationship. 55 Accordingly, the legislature could not
include such claims in worker's compensation .proceedings. 56 Addressing a
more general restriction, the court invalidated a statute that empowered the
trial judge to determine the amount of pUnitive damages to be awarded if the
jury decided that such damages were appropriate. 57 Because fixing the amount
of punitive damages was a traditional jury function, the statute infringed a
plaintiffs right to a jury trial. 5' Similarly, the court rejected a legislative effort
to repeal the collateral source rule, under which insurance payments and other
benefits do not affect the amount of damages awarded in a tort actio!!. s• Doing
away with the collateral source rule, the majority reasoned, violated ~everal
provisions of the Ohio Constitution: the right to jury trial, because a deduction
for collateral benefits was required even if the collateral payments did not
Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co:, 609N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ohio 1993).
ld. at 141-43.
50
Adamsky v. Buckeye Local Sch. Dist., 6S3 N.E.2d 212, syl. (Ohio 1995).
51
/d.at213.
52
/d. at214.
53
/d. at 215; 0HIOCONST. art. I, §2.
54
Brady v. Safety-Kieen Corp., 576 N.E.2d722, syl. (Ohio 1991).
55
/d. at 729. In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion quoted extensively from
the dissenting opinion in Taylor v. Acad.Jron & Metai Co., 522 N.E.2d 464, 476 (Ohio 1988)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
56
576 N.E.2d at 728-29; OHIO CONST. art. II, §35.
57
Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, syl. (Ohio 1994).
58
/d. at 401; OHIO CONST. art. I, §5.
59
Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, syl. (Ohio 1994); see also Depew v. Ogella, 635
N.E.2d 310 (Ohio 1994); May v. Tandy Corp., 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994).
48

49
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compensate for any injury covered by the jury award;•o the right to due course
(or due process) of law, because the elimination of the collateral source rule
did not further a compelling interest in promoting access to affordable
insurance or eliminating double recoveries;•• the guarantee of equal protection
of the Jaws, because jury awards in medical malpractice cases were subject to a
different collateral source rule than were jury awards in all other tort cases;•>
and the right to remedy and open courts, because the repeal of the collateral
source rule could deprive some plaintiffs of their entire jury award. 63
Two points about these rulings bear emphasis. One is that reasonable legal
minds could differ about the issues in these cases. Few of these decisions were
unanimous,•• but only three reflected the four to three split that has
characterized the Ohio Supreme Court in recent years.•s The possibility of
legitimate disagreement means that the direction of tort law could be an
acceptable issue in judicial selection.
The other is that the court's opinions are not especially well reasoned.•• To
take just one example, one can focus on Sorrell v. Thevenir, the case that
struck down the repeal of the collateral source rule. 67 The majority opinion
never addressed the fundamental issues that have made the rule controversial.
Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510.
/d.at51l.
62
/d.at512-13.
63
/d.at513.
64
In two non-unanimous cases, there were no dissenting opinions; the justices who
disagreed simply noted their dissent. Hiatt v. So. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71, 73
(Ohio 1994) (Wright & Pfeifer, JJ., dissenting); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d 140,
144 (Ohio 1993) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
65
The only four to three decisions in this series of cases were Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co.,
639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio l994),Brady v. Safety-Kleen Co., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991), and
Hardy v. Vermenlan, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987). Despite the disagreement among the
justices in Hardy, the result was unanimous. See Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at 632 n.l2 (Wright, J.,
joined by Markus & Holmes, JJ., concurring in judgment only and dissenting in part). Three
justices dissented insofar as the case invalidated the four-year statute of repose in medical
malpractice actions. /d. They agreed, however, that this time limit could not constitutionally
be applied to the plaintiff because the alleged malpractice occurred before the effective date of
the statute. /d.
66
This problem is not confined to tort cases. A notable example from a very different
context is State v. Lessin, 620 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 1993), a four to three ruling that set aside a
conviction for incitement to violence arising from the burning of an American flag during an
antiwar demonstration. The decision was based on inadequate jury instructions. /d. at syl.
Both the majority opinion and the dissenters missed the fundamental constitutional issues in
the case. See Jonathan L. Entin, Right, Wrong in Lessin Decision, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 3, 1993,
at B7.
67
633 N.E.2d 504, syl. (Ohio 1994).
60
61

2002]

JUDICIAL SELECTION AND POLITICAL CULTURE

531

The rule prohibits consideration of collateral payments, such as insurance
benefits, in awarding damages. 68 Those who emphasize compensation as the
primary goal of tort law regard the collateral source rule as an anachronism
because it enables plaintiffs to obtain a windfall: tort damages that come on top
of compensation received from other sources. 6• Supporters of the rule believe
it furthers the goatof punishing wrongdoers by requiring them to pay the full
amount of damages they have caused.7" Both compensation and punishment
are fundamental purposes of tort law. 7' The Sorrell Court never acknowledged
the tension between these purposes, but simply proceeded to treat the rule as
encompassed by various fundamental rights protected by the Ohio
Constitution. 12 This was especially peculiar in lightpfthe~eocy oftherule's
explicit adoption in Ohio and the entire absence of references to the state
constitution in the case that endorsed the rule. 13 Moreover, the majority
opinion raised serious doubts about the continuing vitality of the three-year-old
ruling upholding the statutory abrogation of the collateral source rule in
medical malpractice cases. 14 At the same time, the dissenters offered an
incomplete analysis. They asserted that "the underlying purpose of tort law is
to wholly compensate victims" without addressing tort law's punitive goal or·
explaining why they regarded compensation as primary. 75
Whatever the merits of the Ohio Supreme Court's approach to these
issues, the General Assembly entered the fray with a comprehensive 1996
statute that purported to overturn many of the court's decisions and to enact
68
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 920 cmt. e (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF. TORTS§
920A(2) & cmts. b-e (1979).
69
E.g., John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CAL. L. REV. 1478 (1966).
10
E.g., Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR.
L. REV. 523,528-31 (1991).
71
RESTATEMENTOFTORTS § 901(a), (c) (1939); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §
901 (a), (c) ( 1979).
12
Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510-13. The court's failure to address the view that "[t]he
collateral-source rule is of common law origin and can· be changed by statute," RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. d (1979), is understandable, however. Any statutory change
in the rule must, of course, comport with constitutional requirements.
73
The majority opinion observes that the rule was "adopted" in Pryor v. Webber, 263
N .E.2d 235 (Ohio 1970). Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 509. The Pryor court ~ited Ohio cases dating
back a century in support of its explicit endorsement of the .collateral source rule. Pryor, 263
N.E.2d at 238 (citing Klein v. Thompson, 19 Ohio St. 569 (1869)).
74
Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 512 (discussing Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765,772 (Ohio
1991 )). Indeed, the Sorrell majority reasoned that the different statutory approaches to the
collateral source rule in the malpractice and general tort contexts violated Ohio's constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. /d.
75
/d. at 514 (Moyer, C.J. joined by Wright, J., dissenting).
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numerous other tort reforms.' Trial lawyers and organized labor filed an
original action in the supreme court challenging the measure's
constitutionality. In State ex ref. Ohio Academy ofTrial Lawyers v. Sheward, 71
the court struck down the entire statute by a four to three vote." Justice
Resnick wrote the majority opinion.'• The opinion is remarkable both in its
organization and in its tone, both of which provided ample fodder for critics. •o
The most striking organizational feature was the final section, Part VII, a ninepage rebuttal to the dissenters' principal arguments, which followed what was
labeled as the conclusion in Part VI."' By choosing this form of comeback,
Justice Resnick might have given more credence than necessary to the
dissenters' views. She might have blunted their criticisms more effectively by
incorporating her responses directly into her own discussion, particularly in
footnotes, rather than elevating them to additional prominence as the final
portion of her opinion. "2
Beyond its structure, the opinion raised questions of substance. For
example, Part ill concluded that the challengers, who were seeking to
vindicate public rights, could proceed without demonstrating "any legal or
special individual interest in the result. "'3 But this section did not fully explain
the urgency of allowing a group of trial lawyers and the state labor federation
to pursue a facial attack on the entire statute rather than waiting for individual
plaintiffs to raise specific issues in the ordinary course of litigation." It was
left to a concurring opinion to explain that the very existence of the statutory
tort reforms would deter the filing and pursuit of potentially meritorious
6

76
Act of Sept. 26, 1996, 1996 Ohio Laws 3867. For a generally sympathetic but not
uncritical assessment of this legislation, see Stephen J. Werber, Tort Reform Versus the Ohio
Constillltion, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155 (1996).
77
715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
78
/d. at 1070.
79
ld. at 107 I.
80
There has been no shortage of criticism. E.g., Basil M. Loeb, Comment, Abuse of
Power: Certain State Courts Are Disregarding Standing and Original Jurisdiction Principles
So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitlllional, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 491 (2000); Jonathan
Tracy, Note, Ohio ex rei. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The End Must Justify
the Means, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 883 (2000); State Tort Refonn- Ohio Supreme Court Strikes
Down State General Assembly's Tort Reform Initiative, 113 HARV. L. REV. 804 (2000).
81
State es rei. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyer, 715 N.E.2d at 1103-ll.
82
The structure of Justice Resnick's opinion might have resulted from pressure to
release the decision rather than from a deliberate rhetorical strategy. The original complaint
was filed in November 1997, and the decision was released in Augustl999./d. at 1062, 1068.
The case's importance might have militated against further delay in polishing the opinion, at
least in the majority's eyes.
83
/d. at 1084-85.
84
ld. at 1118-19 (Moyer, C.J.,joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting).
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claims, and that it might take some time for the unconstitutional provisions to
be authoritatively invalidated, if the issues were left to be resolved in ordinary
litigation.'5
Moreover, Justice Resnick's reliance on separation of powers in rejecting
the legislature's effort to reenact provisions that the court had previously
rejected was curious.•• As Chief Justice Moyer explained in his dissent,
"enactment of a law that may be, or even is likely to be, later deemed void by
this court does not constitute a violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers."" He added that the judiciary remains free to invalidate the new
measures as well."' Although the chief justice did not say so, this statement
means that the court should have struck down the reenacted measures for
violating the same constitutional provisions as the original measures did ... If
the first statute of repose violated the right to remedy or due course of law, the
new statute of repose likewise violated those constitutional guarantees. Using
separation of powers to reach this result confuses rather than illuminates the
legal analysis.
Justice Resnick disposed of the rest of the 1996 tort statute by concluding
that the bill contravened the Ohio Constitution's single-subject rule. 90
Moreover, it was impossible to sever any permissible provisions from the
invalid portions.•• The dissenters disagreed, opining that the statute dealt with
the general subject of tort reform (thereby satisfying the single-subject rule) 92
and that any invalid provisions were indeed severable."3 Why the majority took
its approach to these issues can be understood more clearly by examining one
last facet of the case.
The opinion had a particularly striking tone. Justice Resnick began by
characterizing the bill as "a challenge to the judiciary as a coordinate branch of
government."" She curtly rejected the legislature's attempts to reenact
measures that mirrored or differed only cosmetically from those that the court
had previously invalidated-including statutes of repose for claims against
architects and engineers, certificates of merit for medical malpractice claims,
substantial abrogation of the collateral source rule, and caps on punitive and
general damages." 5 She described these legislative measures as attempts "to
85
86

87
88

89
90
91
92
93
94

95

See id. at 1111-12 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
See id. at 1087-97.
/d. at 1120 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting).
See id. at 1121 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting).
See id.
/d. at 1101; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(0).
State ex rei. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1102.
/d. at 1127 (Lundberg Stratton, J., joined by Moyer, C.J., and Cook, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1128 (Lundberg Stratton, J., joined by Moyer, C.J., and Cook, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1073.
/d. at 1085-95. This portion of the opinion also invalidated legislative efforts to
(continued)
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usurp this court's constitutional authority".. and denounced the bill for
"brushing aside a mandate of this court on constitutional issues as if it were of
no consequence," an action that "threatens the judiciary as an independent
branch of government and tears at the fabric of our Constitution."•7 The
General Assembly's reenactment of a previously rejected procedural
requirement was "so fundamentally con.trary to the principle of separation of
powers that it deserves no further comment."•s The new caps on punitive
damages "create[d] the illusion of compliance" with the court's previous
ruling;• but were in fact an "egregious" attempt to subvert the judiciary's
· role ...., The legislature had apparently forgotten that "[t]his is a Constitution we
are dealing with. " 10 '
This blunt language provided ammunition to those who regarded the
opinion as a piece of unbridled judicial activism. Chief Justice Moyer
expressed concern that, with this "inflammatory and accusatory language, the
majority appears to be throwing down the gauntlet to that coequal legislative
branch of government."' 02 There is, however, another way of understanding
Justice Resnick's opinion. Her controversial rhetoric was analogous to the
United States Supreme Court's expansive conception of the judicial role in
Cooper v. Aaron: 103 the Court's interpretation of the Constitution is final and
binding on all other officials. 104 From this perspective, the Ohio General
Assembly's attempt to overrule the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Ohio Constitution by passing a statute was reminiscent of the efforts by
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus and other segregationists to nullify Brown v.
Board of Education. 105 Like those latter-day proponents of interposition, the
General Assembly's gambit did not deserve to be taken seriously, so the
argument in favor of Justice Resnick's approach would go.
Still, this is not the only view of the Ohio situation. Unlike the southern
overrule judicial decisions about the standard for summary judgment in toxic tort cases and the
admissibility of evidence of a common insurer in medical malpractice cases. !d. at I 095-96.
96
ld. at 1086.
97
/d. at 1087.
98
/d.
99
!d. at 109 I.
100
!d.
101
!d.; cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (18I9) ("we must never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding").
102
State ex ret. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 7I5 N.E.2d at I I 14 (Moyer, C.J.,
joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting).
103
358 U.S. I (1958).
104
See id. at 17-I9. This view has attracted its share of criticism. See generally Daniel
A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, I 982 U.IIL L.
REV. 387 (1982).
105
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
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resisters, the legislature did not attack the state supreme court's rulings as
illegitimate or seek to justify defiance of those decisions. '06 Rather, the General
Assembly explained that it "respectfully disagree[ d)" with the Ohio Supreme
Court and intended to "recognize" the positions taken by dissenting justices
and in lower court rulings that the high court had reversed. 107 Although this
language might simply have been a cunningly understated rhetorical salvo in
an undeclared tort "war,"' 08 it c<;mld alternatively have been seen as part of an
interbranch conversation about the meaning of the Ohio Constitution. On this
view, all three branches have an obligation to interpret the constitution; while
the judiciary's interpretation is conclusive as to tl)e parties to a lawsuit, that
interpretation does not necessarily bind everyone else, including the legislative
and executive branches.' 09 The legislature's 1996 tort statute might have been
regarded as an invitation for the court to reconsider its recent decisions. 110
Nevertheless, it is not entirely surprising that Justice Resnick and her
majority colleagues took a less charitable and more adversarial view toward the
General Assembly. The decisions targeted by the 1996 tort reform bill were,
for the most part, decided by relatively wide margins: generally at least five
justices supported the results in those cases.'" Although one new defenseoriented justice (Deborah L.' Cook) had been elected in 1994, there was no
reason to believe that this change would lead the court to rethink its recent
torts jurisprudence. The legislature's sweeping reform measure went well
beyond what the slightly realigned supreme court could be expected to approve
and undoubtedly reflected the priorities of the state's newly energized
Republican party, which in 1994 regained control of both houses of the
General Assembly for the first time in more than two decades, swept all five
executive offices, and ran an aggressive campaign against Justice Resnick in
her successful bid for reelection.' 12
This is in marked contrast to the Southern Manifesto, a joint statement condemning
Brown by almost all members of Congress from the South. 102 CONG. REC. 4460-61,4515-16
(1956).
107
State ex rei. Ohio Acad. Of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1073-75 n.7, 1086.
108
See id. at 1072 n.4 (quoting Werber, supra note 76; at 1156).
109
E.g., ~Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 43-48 (1991); Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580-81, 655-58 (1993).
110
There is some history of such invitations at the federal level. For example, the
Truman administration filed a brief in 1950 that asked the Supreme Court to repudiate Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Brief for the United States at 35-49, Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25). More recently, the Reagan and first Bush
administrations repeatedly asked the Court to overrule Rae v. Wade, 410 U.S. I 13 (1973).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
111
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
112
Justice Resnick was the only Democrat to win a statewide race that year, and hers
(continued)
106
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There will be more to say about this, but for now, some tentative
conclusions can be reached. First, tort doctrine was emerging as a contentious
subject in Ohio. The supreme court had become decidedly sympathetic to
plaintiffs on issues over which there were .legitimate grounds for
disagreement. 113 Second, many opinions in tort cases-whatever position they
took-were not especially persuasive, although perhaps only law professors
care very much about inelegant prose and inadequate reasoning. 11 ' Third, the
majority believed that the issues raised by the legislature's omnibus tort bill
were sufficiently significant to justify the use of expansive procedural devices
to expedite judicial review of that measure. 115 Fourth, the tone of the legal
debate had become increasingly harsh as the 2000 election approached. 116
The law of torts, however, was not the only contentious issue in Ohio. The
dominant focus of political debate was school funding, a subject that was put
on the agenda by another controversial state supreme court ruling.

B. School Funding
In 1991, a coalition of school districts, educators, parents, and children
filed a lawsuit alleging that Ohio's system of financing public schools violated
the Ohio Constitution.'' 7 In DeRolph v. State, 11 ' by the same four to three vote
that struck down the 1996 tort bill, 119 the supreme court held that primary
reliance on local property taxes violated the Thorough and Efficient Clause of
the Ohio Constitution.' 2" The lead opinion, by Justice Francis E. Sweeney,
relied heavily on trial testimony about the deplorable conditions in many
was a nominally nonpartisan election. See LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND
POLICY 115 (4th ed. 1998); RONALD A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN
AMERICA 263 (4th ed. 1998). For further discussion of Justice Resnick's 1994 reelection, see
infra notes 292-299 and accompanying text.
113
See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
114
See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
115
State ex rei. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1079-85
(Ohio 1999) (stating that an action for the extraordinary wits of mandamus and prohibition
were appropriate to review the tort reform bill).
116
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
117
Nine Years of Litigation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 12, 2000, at A6.
118 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter referred to as DeRoiph 1].
119 State ex rei. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
120 Derolplz /, 677 N.E.2d at 747; 0H10CONST. art. VI,§ 2 ("The general assembly shall
make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as ... will secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the State .... "). The court issued an order clarifying its
first ruling in DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997), but that order contains little of
substance for the present discussion. It reiterated the main point of DeRoiph /, that property
taxes could continue to be used as long as they were not the primary means for financing public
schools. /d.
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school districts. in concluding that the state had breached its con~titutional
obligations.'2 ' The court provided no specific remedial guidelines, saying only
that the legislature "must create an entirely new school financing system"
within one year.' 22 Perhaps recognizing the weakness of an opinion built
largely on anecdotal evidence, Justice Douglas wrote a comprehen~ive
concurrence that examined the system of public school funding in considerable
detail, 123 describing the inadeqyacy and inequity of the current funding system .
with examples from several of the plaintiff school districts,'" and tracing the
history and antecedents of Ohio's constitutional provisions relating to
education. '25 ·Justice Douglas also directly addressed the impact of Board of
Education v. Walter,l26 which rejected an earlier challenge to a subsequently
repealed state school aid formula.' 2' This was particularly significant because
the dissenters based much of their argument on that case, contending the
legislature was constitutionally required only to fund schools that met
minimum standards; how much more the state should spend on elementary and
secondary education was a nonjusticiable political question. 128
DeRolph I generated widespread controversy, including some apparently
serious proposals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over school funding cases. 129
Cooler heads prevailed, and the General Assembly authorized substantial
increases in state funding for public schools. The plaintiffs returned to court,
and, in May 2000, Ju.stice Resnick wrote for another four to three majority to
hold the legislature's response insufficient. 130 In marked contrast to the tort
case, m her opinion was extremely deferential to the legislature. She noted the
"substantial amount of legislation" that had been adopted in response to the
court's first ruling, 132 described the adjustment of the state's basic aid formula

Derolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 742-45.
/d. at 747.
123
/d. at 750-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
124
/d, at 757-68 (Douglas, J., concurring).
125
/d. at 768-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
126 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).
127
DeRolph I, 677 N,E.2d at 773-74 (Douglas, J., concurring).
128
/d. at 782, 783, 785, 786 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., .
dissenting). On the merits, the dissenters found no violation of the Thorough and Efficient
Clause even if the issues were justiciable./d. at 793 (Moyer, C.J.,joined by Cook & Lundberg ·
Stratton, 11:, dissenting).
129
Jonathan L. Entin, Schools Need the Judicial Process, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar.
12, 1999,atAI3.
130
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1020-22 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter referred to as
DeRolph II].
131
See supra note 94-10 I and accompanying text.
132
DeRolph II, 728 N.E:2d at 1003.
121

122
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as "certainly a positive step,"' "acknowledge[d] the progress the General
Assembly has made" in elevating public education as a budgetary priority, 13'
observed that the legislature "has attempted to formulate a viable plan to fund
the construction of new school facilities and to repair Ohio's decaying school
buildings,"' 35 and recognized that the state "has taken some steps to eliminate
forced borrowing" by local school districts. 136 All of this was "evidence of
some positive developments."' 37
Despite the conciliatory tone, the majority concluded that much remained
to be done. '3' A glaring deficiency identified in DeRolph I was overreliance on
property taxes, but "this aspect of the former system persists in the state's
current funding plan, wholly unchanged."' 39 Moreover, improvements were
needed in almost every other area. 140
The DeRolph II opinion had many fewer problems than did its counterpart
in DeRolph /,and its rhetoric is much less acerbic than that in Ohio Academy
of Trial Lawyers, the tort case. Nonetheless, certain aspects of DeRolph /I left
Justice Resnick vulnerable to criticism in the election. One potential problem
was her inability or unwillingness to define the limits of judicial oversight, as
in her observations that "[t]he definition of 'thorough and efficient' is not
static""' and that "much more is involved in this process than merely providing
funds. "'•2 This raises the specter of an unending cycle of judicial supervision
of the state's school funding and budgetary priorities, which is at least a fair
criticism at election time.' 43
33

!d. at 1005.
!d. at 1008.
135
!d. at 1009.
136
!d. at 1012.
137
!d. at 1020.
us !d. at 1021-22.
139
!d. at 1013. The only meaningful effort to move away from property taxes was a
proposal to increase the state sales tax, but the voters rejected that idea by a wide margin in
May 1998. !d. at 1015.
140
!d. at 1021. The dissenters adhered to their view that the case presented
nonjusticiable political questions but opined that, on the merits, the state's response to
DeRolph I had been more than adequate. !d. at 1029 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg
Stratton, JJ., dissenting). Justice Cook contended that the court should simply acknowledge its
prior mistake and treat the case as nonjusticiable. !d. at 1036 (Cook, J., dissenting).
141
!d. at 1001.
142
!d. at 1019-20. One indication of the potential open-endedness of the lawsuit
appeared in the midst of her lengthy conclusion, where she for the first time broached the need
for classroom computers. See id. at I 020.
143
See id. at 1029 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting);
see also DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733, 786-87 (Ohio 1997) (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook &
Lundberg Stratton, JJ ., dissenting).
133

134
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Justice Resnick's authorship of the lead opinions in two of the most
publicized and contentious cases on the Ohio Supreme Court's docket in the
runup to her reelection provided ample opportunity for legitimate criticism.
This does not, however, explain why the campaign became so vitriolic.'..
Although most states elect their judges,"s few serious contests occur even for
supreme court seats., •• The seeming excesses of judicial elections, such as the
2000 Ohio campaign, have prompted some refonners to advocate the
elimination, or at least reduction, of popular voting for the third branch of state
govemment.''7 The notion that politics can be removed from judicial selection
is a heroic one. The next section addresses this problem.

II. POLillCS AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
Any system of judicial selection must address the cardinal values of
independence and accountability. 148 Judges must be independent enough to
decide cases according to law rather than popular whim, but accountabie
enough not to run roughshod over the people's Iiberties. 14• The states have
emphasized accountability, with most judges having to face the electorate at
some point. 'so Chief Justice Moyer's proposal to appoint rather than elect state
judges in the wake of last year's ugly Ohio Supreme Court campaign implies
that accountability has been taken to excess. 's'
Aside- from the unlikely prospect that Ohio will stop electing judges
anytime soon, 152 Chief Justice Moyer's proposal implies that the influence of
politics can be removed (or at least reduced) by opting for a different mode of
choosing judges. 153 In fact, the federal model of appointing judges can serve as
a useful check on this idea. It turns out that elective and appointive systems do
not differ all that much in their actual operation. For example, most incumbent
See generally supra noteS 1-3 and accompanying text.
BAUM, supra note 112, at 114-15; CARP& STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 262-64.
146
BAUM, supra note 112, at 116, 120; Richard L. Hasen, "High Coun Wrongly
Elected": A Public Choice Model ofJudging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1997).
147 <CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 265.
148 See Roger Handberg, Selection and Retention ofJudges: Is Florida's Present System
Still the Best Compromise?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 134 (1994) (suggesting accountability is
"as critical as" independence).
149 See BAUM, supra note 112, at 101.
150 /d. at 114-15.
151
See Bradshaw, supra note 3.
152 Julie Carr Smyth, Legislators Uninterested in Appointed Judges: Chief Justice
Seeking Allies to Push'ldea, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 18, 2001, at 82. The idea of appointing
judges in Ohio is not new. See Francis R. Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement, and
Compensation of Judges in Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408,420-21 (1931).
153
See Bradshaw, supra note 3.
144

145
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judges are rarely opposed for reelection, and the overwhelming majority of
judges who face the voters retain their seats.' 5' Meanwhile, federal judges
sometimes find themselves at the center of political controversy. Consider in
this regard the story of Judge Harold Baer of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. After granting a motion to suppress
evidence in a drug case, he was threatened with impeachment by congressional
leaders and virtually invited to resign by the White House, where the press
secretary declared President Clinton would await Judge Baer's ruling on the
government's motion to reconsider his original ruling before taking a formal
stand on Judge Baer' s continuance in office. 155
This section focuses on the federal bench, both the Supreme Court and the
lower courts. The politics of federal judicial appointments can be seen most
clearly in connection with the selection of Supreme Court justices.' 56 This is
hardly surprising in light of the Court's position at the apex of the national
judiciary. For at least two decades, however, appointments to federal district
courts and courts of appeals have also reflected political concernsY' The main
conclusion to be drawn from this brief discussion is that political
considerations are ubiquitous in judicial selection, even when the judges need
not face the voters.

A. The Supreme Court
Political considerations have long influenced the selection of Supreme
Court justices.m Presidents generally nominate justices who share their
political ideology, but they must take account of the views of various interest
groups as well as the Senate's role in confirming nominees. •s• For much of the
twentieth century, discussion about prospective justices focused on supposedly

154
See BAUM, supra note 112, at 120; B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial
Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1429-30 (2001 ).
155
Carl E. Stewart, Colltemporary Challenges to Judicial independence, 43 LOY. L.
REV. 293, 298-300 (1997). Judge Baer seems to have gotten the message; on reconsideration
he decided that the drug evidence was admissible after all. United States v. Bayless, 9I3 F.
Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y 1996), vacated on reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 2I I (S.D.N.Y. I996),
aff'd, United States v. Bayless, 20 I F.3d I I 6 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding no abuse of discretion by
Judge Baer in reconsidering his initial ruling on suppression and rejecting the defendant's
argument that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek Judge Baer's recusal), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. !06I (2000).
156
See Part II.A. infra.
157
See Part II.B. infra.
158
See generally William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial
Selection Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. I, 3-25 ( 1990).
159
See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 17-52 ( 1999).
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neutral factors relating to judicial competence.' To be sure, there were
controversies about some nominees, but the debate turned largely on symbolic
questions of ethics and character because explicit consideration of ideology
was regarded as inappropriate.'"' The lengthy dispute about Justice Brandeis's
nomination in 1916 illustrates this phenomenon.'"2 Until 1970, the only
twentieth-century nominee who faced significant ideological opposition in the
Senate was Judge John Parker, whose nomination was rejected in 1930.'"3
Parker was attacked by the NAACP for racist campaign speeches he made as
the unsuccessful Republican candidate for governor of North Carolina in 1918
and for by unions his rulings in labor cases.'"'
The public gentility that shrouded the politics of Supreme Court
appointments began to erode in 1968 when Chief Justice Earl Warren
announced his retirement effective on the confirmation of his successor.'"5 The
announcement came well into a presidential election year in which Republican
candidate Richard Nixon seemed likely to win (as he in fact did). 166 Warren's
timing fueled concern that he wanted to deprive Nixon, who had criticized
many Warren Court decisions and who had been his political rival in
California, of the chance to fill the vacancy with his own selection.'"7 Outgoing
President Lyndon Johnson nominated his old friend Justice Abe Fortas to fill
the vacancy, but Fortas withdrew in the face of a Senate filibuster.'"' He
remained on the Court for another year, then was forced to resign under an
ethical cloud.'••
The public role of ideology began to increase in salience with President
Nixon's failed nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth to succeed Fortas in
60

/d. at 1-2.
/d. at 3.
162
See generally A.L. TODD, JUSTICEONTRIAL:THECASEOFLoutsD. BRANDEIS (1964).
163
See generally KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF AGE": THE DEFEAT OF
JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER ( 1990); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A
STUDY OFTHECONFIRMATIONOFAPPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITEDSTATESSENATE 127-32 (1953).
164
Ross, supra note 158, at 10-13.
165
ld. at 15-1.6.
166
See ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 218.
167
BERNARD SCHWARIZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT- A
JUDICiAL BIOGRAPHY 680-82 ( 1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 306-,.
07' 309 (1982).
168
See ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 218-19. Most of the explicit arguments against
Fortas dealt with cronyism because Fortas had a long and close relationship with Johnson
before his appointment as an associate justice in 1965. ld at 216. Nonetheless, general
hostility to the Court's liberal rulings, as opposed to any particular Fortas opinion, played some
. role in the opposition. /d. at 31-32.
169
LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: ABIOGRAPHY359-78 (1990); BRUCEALI.ENMURPHY,
FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF ASUPREME COURT JUSTICE 545-77 ( 1988).
160
161
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1970. Although Haynsworth was attacked for alleged ethicallapses, 17 ' his
opponents emphasized his rulings in favor of management in labor cases and
his conservative approach to civil rights issues. 112 But ideological concerns
receded after the Senate rejected Haynsworth. 173 President Nixon's next
choice, Judge Harrold Carswell, was regarded as extremely conservative, but
the opposition concentrated on his obvious lack of competence. 17' Ideology _
played almost no role in the confirmation of Nixon's third choice, Justice
Harry B lackmun, although B lackmun' s civil rights record had weaknesses that
were never pursued. 175
Ideology emerged with a vengeance during the pitched battle over
President Reagan's unsuccessful nomination of Judge Robert Bark in 1987. 176
Bark's confirmation hearing featured a five-day grilling on an extraordinary
array of issues, and, in the end, he was rejected largely because his views on
important constitutional questions were regarded as extreme. 177 Ideology also
played a prominent role in the debate over the nomination of Justice Clarence
Thomas, although that subject was overshadowed by the controversy over
170

Ross, supra note 158, at 16.
JOHN P. FRANK,CLEMENTHAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, ANDTHESUPREMECOURT2122, 45, 51-56 (1991).
172
Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of Political Debate, II
YALE L & PoL'Y REV. 407,412-14 (1993). His most controversial civil rights ruling came in
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors. !d. at 412. Haynsworth held that the federal courts should
abstain from hearing a lawsuit challenging the closure of the public schools in Prince Edward
County, one of the original defendants in Brown v. Board of Education, while a parallel case
was proceeding slowly in the Virginia courts. Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332.
343-44 (4th Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court reversed that ruling and ordered the schools
reopened. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
173
Ross, supra note 158, at 19-20.
174
ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 11-12; Entin, supra note 172, at414-15. Carswell's
fate was effectively sealed when his leading Senate supporter, defending him against charges of
mediocrity, said: "Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and
lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't
have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that there." FRANK, supra
note 171, at 112.
175
Entin, supra note 172, at 417-18. Ideological opposition was almost completely
absent when Nixon chose another southerner, Lewis Powell, for a subsequent vacancy, even
though Powell also had an awkward civil rights record. !d. at 418-19.
176
See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA ( 1989).
177
Some senators voted against Bork less out of conviction than on straightforward
political calculation: a desire to satisfy important constituency groups. /d. at 285-86, 289-92.
Bork' s opponents, like some of Justice Resnick's, used a sophisticated but not always accurate
publicity campaign in an effort to scuttle his confirmation. /d. at 157-60, 177-80.
170
171
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Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations against him.""
On the other hand, ideological debate was subdued in other recent
confirmation proceedings. For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was
selected in large part to fulfill President Reagan's campaign pledge to appoint
the first woman to the Court; most of the limited criticism she encountered
came from those who complained that she was too sympathetic to abortion
rights.' 79 Justice Antonin Scalia was touted as the Court's first Italian
American member and won unanimous confirmation.'•" Justice Anthony
Kennedy's conservative record on the Ninth Circuit generated almost no
opposition; he was confirmed with the backing of some of Judge Bark's
harshest critics.'"' Many skeptics suspected that Justice David Souter was a
closet extremist based on his sponsorship by the very conservative White
House chief of staff, but they had little other basis for condemning him
because he was almost completely unknown before his nomination.' 82 Most
recently, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer faced questions
that related to ideology but evaded them without much negative reaction from
senators, and both were easily confirmed.'•'
At the same time, ideological considerations did affect these nominations.
President Reagan and the first President Bush certainly sought relatively
conservative nominees who could be confirmed by the Senate when they
selected O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter.'.. President Clinton twice
seriously considered Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, but ultimately
chose Ginsburg and Breyer due in part to the prospect of opposition from
powerful Republican Senators.'"' Moreover, Clinton was almost dissuaded
from choosing Ginsburg, who had litigated most of the major gender
discrimination cases that reached the Court during the 1970's, because some

178
See generally JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNilZ, CAPITOL GAMES:
CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF ASUPREME COURT NOMINATION (1992).
179
ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 284.
ISO /d. at 293-94. Scalia's prospects were helped by his being nominated at the same
time that then-Justice Rehnquist was selected to succeed Chief Justice Burger. Rehnquist's
nomination was controversial, which might have deflected opposition to Scalia. /d. at 292,
294.
181
BRONNER, supra note 176, at337-38.
182
ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 305-06.
183
Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 925-29
(1995).
184
ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at -284, 294,299,305. Although Souter has not turned
out to be as conservative as expected, ex-President Bush professes no disappointment at this
development. /d. at 308.
185
/d. at 317,322.
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feminists viewed her as insufficiently committed to their cause. 186
This brief summary should suffice to show that political considerations
play a substantial role in Supreme Court appointments. Ideology matters to the
Presidents who appoint justices and often affects the confirmation process."'
Opposition is more likely with a chief executive from one party and a Senate
controlled by the other, as was true of the Haynsworth, Carswell, Bork, and
Thomas nominations. But divided government does not necessarily lead to
confrontation, as the examples of Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer
demonstrate. Conflict is also more probable when the seat at issue can affect
the Court's direction, as demonstrated by the filibuster against Fortas during
the 1968 presidential election campaign' 88 and the Bork controversy, which
arose in large measure because he seemed likely to provide the deciding vote
on several high-stakes issues and had announced his willingness to repudiate
precedents of which he disapproved. 189 This last observation has significant
implications for understanding the vigorous campaign against Justice Resnick:
on a court divided four to three on issues that matter intensely to various
interest groups, defeating one member of the majority can change the direction
of legal doctrine. This point will be addressed again later, but first it is worth
devoting some attention to the politics of appointments to the federal appellate
and district courts.
B. The Lower Federal Courts
A somewhat different sort of politics typifies the process for appointing
federal circuit and district judges. Although the Constitution gives the
President the power to nominate these judges subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate,' 90 senators have long played a major role in judicial selection.
This has been especially true of district judgeships, where the tradition of
senatorial courtesy allowed a home-state senator of the chief executive's party
to recommend judicial candidates and to block other nominees. '9 ' Senatorial
courtesy does not apply at the appellate level, although it is understood that
each state in a circuit is entitled to its share of seats and senators from the party
that controls the White House typically recommend candidates. 192
Appointments to the lower courts have become a more visible matter in
/d. at 318-19.
See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
188
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
189
See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
190
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
191
ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 20-21; BAUM, supra note 112, at 107; CARP &
STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 224-26. When a state had senators of different parties, they
occasionally negotiated an arrangement under which the senator of the opposite party could
recommend a few district judges. BAUM, supra note 112, at 108-09.
192
CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 232.
186

187
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recent decades, however, as various administrations have regarded those courts
as important political vehicles. President Reagan and the first President Bush
tried to appoint conservatives to circuit and district judgeships,,., whereas
President Johnson sought to select judges, especially in the South, who were
sympathetic to civil rights.••• President Clinton focused less strictly on
ideology than on increasing the diversity of the federal bench.,.,
The process became notably contentious during the Clinton years,
especially after Republicans captured control of the Senate in the 1994
election. The pace of confirmations slowed to a crawl, with only seventeen
judges (none at the appellate level) approved during the second session of the
104th Congress in 1996.••• Although the administration was partly at fault for
taking longer than its predecessors to nominate judges, the Senate also
extended the time it took to act on those nominations. 197 An especially
egregious example is Judge Richard Paez, who waited four years to be
confirmed for a seat on the Ninth Circuit. ••• Partisan sniping over judicial
appointments has continued since Clinton left office.I99
Several factors help to explain the increasing difficulty of filling lower
court judgeships. An important one is divided government: a Senate
controlled by one party has little interest in allowing a President of the other to
pack the federal bench and will exercise its constitutional prerogatives more
assiduously than it would if the same party controlled both branches. 200 Beyond

BAUM, supra note 112, at 1 II.
Id. This contrasted with President Kennedy's acquiescence to pressure from powerful
Senators who insisted on the appointment of segregationists. CARP & STIDHAM, supra note
112, at 230.
195
Id.; CARP& STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 230, 233; Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at
the Clinton Administration's End, 19 LAw & INEQ. 159, 159 (2001). The overwhelming
majority of Clinton's judicial appointments were Democrats, though. See ABRAHAM, supra
note 159, at 50.
196
BAUM, supra note 112, at 112; Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing
Congressional Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 KY. L.J. 679, 761 (1999).
197
Lauren M. Cohen, Missing in Action: Interest Groups and Federal Judicial
Appointments, 82 JUDICATURE 119, 121 (1998); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's
Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 271-73 (1999);
Thomas 0. Sargentich, Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection of Citizens for
Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1031, 1044 (1999).
198
Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointmellls
Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1709 n.79 (2001).
199
See Amy Goldstein, Bush Blasts Democrats for Lagging on Judicial Nominees,
WASH. POST, May 4, 2002, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senat Trade
Blame for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9.
200
BAUM, supra note 112, at 112; Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New
Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Conselll," 53
(continued)
193

194
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that factor, however, are several others that have emerged in recent years: the
heightened salience of intractable issues like abortion and affirmative action
that do not lend themselves to compromise, the activities ofinterest groups that
closely monitor judicial appointments, and the permanent campaign that leads
both parties to begin mobilizing toward the next election within hours of the
final vote tabulation. 201 All of these factors have contributed to institutional
changes in the Senate that have complicated the judicial confirmation process.
Among these are a decline in deference to colleagues, the more frequent use
or threatened use of procedural devices that give individual Senators an
effective veto power over committee and floor agendas, and the power of
committee chairs to refuse to act on nominations. 202
The federal experience has implications for the Buckeye State. As
deplorable as the excesses of 2000 might be, those excesses cannot be
attributed exclusively to the process for choosing members of the Ohio
Supreme Court. The election was certainly political, 203 but contemporary
federal experience suggests that politics cannot be transcended by using a
purely appointive system.204 Moreover, recent developments in the rules
relating to judicial campaigning raise serious questions about the prospects for
compelling those who care about judicial selection to adhere to higher
standards of discourse. 205 The next section focuses on some of those
developments.

III.

THE DUBIOUS PROSPECT ofLIMITrNG CAMPAIGN ATTACKS

Harsh campaign rhetoric in judicial elections may be ameliorated by
enforcing existing rules that limit what judges and judicial candidates may say.
Speech restrictions in judicial elections have been controversial/06 but this
approach has been tried in Ohio. The leading case, In re Harper/"7 arose from
Justice Resnick's successfull994 reelection campaign. Resnick's opponent in
that race, Judge Sara J. Harper, was reprimanded for running a television
advertisement that attacked Resnick for accepting more than $300,000 in
ADMIN.

L. REv. I, 12 (2001 ); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 197, at 271.

supra note 112, at 112; Denning, supra note 200, at 12-14.
note 112, at 112; Denning, supra note 200, at 14--21.
203
See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
204
See Parts I I.A. and B. supra.
205
See Part III infra.
206
See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059 (1996)(supporting restrictions); Lloyd B. Snyder, The
Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for
Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1987) (opposing most restrictions).
201
673 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1996). The tribunal that decided this case was a special panel
made up of twelve appellate judges sitting by designation on the Ohio Supreme Court. I d. at
1255 n.l.
201

BAUM,

202

BAUM, supra
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contributions from triallawyers. The ad showed a large check drawn on an
account called "Sue & Sue, Trial Lawyers" and signed "Cheatem Good."109
Harper was found to have undermined public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary and to have failed to maintain the dignity
appropriate to the judicial office in violation of two provisions of the Ohio
Code of Judicial Conduct. 210 Voters, the court concluded, might reasonably
have inferred from the ad that plaintiffs' lawyers as a class are dishonest and
that these dubious characters wanted Resnick to win. 211 Whatever else might
be said about the controversial spot,212 it appears rather tame compared to the
thinly veiled charges of corruption and vote selling that aired repeatedly in
2000. 213
The provisions under which Judge Harper was charged were superseded
when Ohio adopted new standards in 1995. 214 Canon 7 of Ohio's new Code of
Judicial Conduct, which directs judges and candidates to "refrain from
political activity inappropriate to judicial office," contains two specific
provisions that bear on this subject. One limits what candidates may say about
themselves. 215 Canon 7(B) proscribes "statements that commit or appear to
commit the judge or judicial candidate with respect to cases or controversies
that are likely to come before the court."216 The other restricts what they can
say about others. 217 Canon 7(E) prohibits an incumbent or aspiring judge from
disseminating "information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent,
either knowing the information to be false or with reckless disregard of
whether or not it was false or, if true, that would be deceiving or misleading to
a reasonable person. " 118
It is not at all certain that rigorous enforcement of these provisions can
elevate the tone of judicial election campaigns. Restrictions on what judges
and judicial candidates may say could well violate the First Amendment. That
208

/d. at 1256.
/d.
210
/d. at 1267-68.
211
/d.at1267.
212
Judge Harper, who had never before been disciplined in a long career on the bench,
initially had reservations but eventually approved the ad for use in her campaign. /d. at 1256.
213
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
214
Both sets of rules were based on American Bar Association proposals. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). The 1972
rules were adopted in forty-seven states, the 1990 version in twenty-two. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN
ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.02, at 3-5 & nn.19~23 (3d ed. 2000).
215
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at Canon 7(B)(2)(d).
208

209

216

/d.

211

!d. Canon 7(E)(l).
/d.
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argument was raised unsuccessfully in Harper,Z 19 but it has fared better in some
other courts. 22" Because these restrictions apply to political speech, they are
evaluated under strict scrutiny. 221 Accordingly, regulations must serve a
compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 222 Courts
have consistently held that the states have a compelling interest in protecting
the integrity ofthe judiciary. 223 The dispositive question has been whether the
restrictions satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. 220
Consider Canon ?(B)'s prohibition on statements that reflect an advance
commitment on matters that are likely to come before the court.m The case law
on this topic has arisen under a version of the Code of Judicial Conduct that
forbade a judge or judicial candidate from "announc[ing] his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues."226 Courts have genemlly agreed that this
sweeping language, litemlly understaod, would prohibit almost any statement
other than bland promises to perform faithfully and impartially on the bench.227
So construed,. therefore, this limitation mises serious questions · of
overbreadth. 228 The restriction might be saved from invalidity through a
narrowing construction that it applies only to speech on matters that are likely
to come before the court. 229 The fedeml courts of appeals have disagreed on
whether such a narrowing construction could salvage the rule. 230 The Third
Circuit held that the restriction should be so limited and upheld on this basis in
219
Judge Harper argued that the two provisions of the prior version of the Code of
Judicial Conduct were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad both on their face and as
applied. Harper, 673 N.E.2d at 1260--67.
220
The Ohio Supreme Court avoided the merits of a constitutional challenge to the prior
version of Canon 7(E)(I ), on procedural grounds. Christensen v. 8<1. ofComm'rs, 575 N.E.2d
790 (Ohio 1991) (per curiam). First Amendment arguments seem not to have been raised in
other recent disciplinary proceedings arising from judicial campaigns. E.g., Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 733 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 2000); In re Kienzle, 708 N.E.2d 800
(Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999); In re Runyan, 707 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges
1999) (dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence); In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio
Comm'n of Judges 1999); In re Carr, 658 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1995).
221
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1991).
222
223

/d.
/d. at 142.

227

See, e.g., id. at 142-44.
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(I)(c) (1972).
See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993).

228

/d.

224
225
226

Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1991).
Robert M. Brode, Note, Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board and Stretton v.
Disciplinary Board of the Supreine Court: First Amendment Limits on Ethical Restrictions of
Judicial Candidate's Speech, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1085, 1086 (1994).
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. Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court ofPennsylvania. m The
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner, held to the
contrary in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board. 232 A sharply divided
panel ofthe Eighth Circuit recently sided with the Third Circuit and upheld the
restriction as narrowly construed. 233
In June 2002, a closely divided Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit
and held that the Announce Clause of the old Canon 7(B) violates the First
Amendment. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White234, a five to four
majority concluded that the proscription against a judicial candidate's
announcing her views on disputed legal or political issues was not narrowly
tailored to promote the state's interests in judicial impartiality or the
appearance ofimpartiality. 235 The Court considered three possible meanings of
judicial impartiality and found that the restriction failed under all of them. To
the extent that impartiality means the absence of bias for or against a litigant,
which the majority apparently assumed to be a compelling interest, the
Announce Clause was irrelevant because it did not apply to speech favoring or
opposing specific litigants but rather to speech about legal questions. 236
Protecting impartiality in the sense of avoiding declarations about views
favoring or opposing a specific legal point, the majority opined, was simply
not a compelling interest and hence could not pass muster as a justification for
the restriction. 237 Finally the ban could not be justified as a means of protecting
judicial open mindedness both because the state had not relied on this
justification in adopting Canon 7(B) and because this restriction was fatally
underinclusive in that it did not limit other forms of speech about disputed
legal issues·23 '
Of course, Ohio's new Canon 7(B) explicitly limits its prohibition to
comments on issues that are likely to come before the court. 239 This alone
might save the provision from First Amendment attack. 2411 That is the lesson of
Kentucky's experience. In J. C.J.D. v. R.J. C.R./41 the state supreme court held
that the blanket ban on statements about disputed legal or political issues was

944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991).
997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993).
233
Republican PartyofMinn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854,881-83 (8th Cir. 2001); but see id.
at 894 (Beam, J., dissenting).
234
122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
235
/d. at 2534-37.
236
See id. at 2535.
237
/d. at 2536.
238
See id. at 2536-37.
239
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B){2)(d).
240
See Stretton, 944 F.3d at 144.
241
803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991).
231
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unconstitutionally overbroad and refused to adopt a narrowing construction.242
The state then adopted a new provision that is identical with Ohio's new
Canon 7(B), which the court upheld against First Amendment challenge in
Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission. 243 Before concluding
that this decision resolves the constitutional question, it should be noted that
there ·was a strong dissenting opinion arguing that even this narrower
restriction violated the First Amendment. 241 The problem with limiting the
prohibition to statements· about matters "that are likely to come before the
court," as Judge Posner explained in Buckley, is that almost any controversial
matter could come before a court, so that limitation might not meaningfully
confine the scope of the restriction. 245 This question need not be resolved here.
This question need not be resolved here, although some language in the
majority opinion in Republican Party ofMinnesota suggests that the Supreme
Court might reject even the new Canon ?(B)'s narrow limitation on judicial
speech.246 ' For now, it suffices to say that the constitutionality of the new
Canon 7(B) remains unsettled.
It is now appropriate to consider Canon 7(E)'s prohibition on false,
deceiving, or misleading campaign statements. 247 The case law from other
jurisdictions has generally dealt with an earlier proscription against any
statement that "the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law. " 24 s Several recent decisions have found this
proscription unconstitutionaJ.249 The leading case on false statements is In re

ld. at 956.
873 S.W.2d 200,204-05 (Ky. 1994); see also Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Retirement
& Removal Comrn'n, 776 F. Supp. 309,315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (denying preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the ban on statements about issues "that are likely to come before the
court" but granting an injunction against enforcement of a ban on campaign speech about
matters of judicial administration); Sumrne v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 947
S. W.2d 42, 47-48 (Ky. 1997) (relying on Deters to reject a First Amendment challenge to the
new restriction on speech about matters "that are likely to come before the court").
244
Deters, 873 S. W.2d at 205-07 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Summe v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d at 52, 54
(Graves, J., dissenting).
245
Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229.
246
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (expressing
skepticism that judges will feel compelled to rule consistently with campaign statem~nts
that do not entail promises to vote in a particular way on a particular issue).
247
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(E).
248
See, e.g., In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31,36 (Mich. 2000), cert. Denied sub nom.
Chimura v. Mich. Judicial Tenure Comm'n, 531 U.S. 828 (2000).
249
!d. at 45; Weaver v. Bonuer, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
242
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250

Chmura, in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that the proscription
was not narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in protecting
judicial integrity and impartiality. 251 The decision rested on overbreadth
concerns: the restriction permitted punishment for false statements that were
not made with actual malice. m To avoid this problem, the court narrowed it to
cover only false statements made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. 253 A federal district court in Georgia relied on Chmura
to strike down a similar Peach State restriction on judicial campaign speech.m
The court declined to adopt a narrowing construction that might have saved the
prohibition despite recognizing the importance of the state interests at stake.m
The provision of Ohio's Canon 7(E) prohibiting false statements explicitly
requires such statements to be made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth. 256 Accordingly, this portion appears to satisfy First
Amendment requirements.
The situation might be different with regard to deceptive or misleading
statements, however. Chmura found that the ban on such statements "greatly
chills debate regarding the qualifications of candidates for judicial office. " 2' 7
This was one reason that the Michigan court found the old restriction facially
unconstitutional. 258 The Alabama Supreme Court just recently struck down
language that is identical with Ohio Canon 7(E)'s ban on statements "that
would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person."259 In Butler v.
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission,,., the court held that this provision "is
unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the plain effect of chilling First
Amendment rights."26 ' Relying heavily on an opinion by a federal district
judge at an earlier stage of the proceedings,262 the court explained that
250
608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Chmura v. Mich. Judicial
Tenure Comm'n, 531 U.S. 828 (2000).
251
!d. at 45.
252
/d. at 41; cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,280 (1964) (defining
actual malice as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
253
Chmura, 608 N. W.2d at 4 3. The court emphasized that this standard was objective,
unlike the subjective standard approved in New York Times v. "Sullivan. !d. at 43-44.
254
Weaverv. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
255
/d. at 1343.
256
OHio CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 7(E).
257
Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 42.
258
/d. at 43.
259
OHio CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 7(E){I ).
260
802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 200 I).
261
/d. at 218.
262
The case arose when Justice Harold See ofthe Alabama Supreme Court filed suit in
federal district court challenging the constitutionality of campaign speech restrictions that
formed the basis of an investigation by the state's Judicial Inquiry Commission. Id. at 210-11.
(continued)
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candidates would be deterred from making even true statements for fear of
incurring potentially severe sanctions and that this would in tum unduly limit
political debate. 2"3 The state court accordingly removed the language about
deceptive or misleading statements, leaving only the prohibition on false
statements made with actual malice. 264
These decisions strongly suggest that the provision in Ohio's Canon 7(E)
prohibiting the dissemination of"true [statements] that would be deceiving or
misleading to a reasonable person"265 also contravenes the First Amendment.
This is particularly troublesome for proponents oflimits on obnoxious attacks
ofthe sort that were directed at Justice Resnickbecause many ofthose attacks
were not literally false. Instead, as in Harper, the business groups' ads got
their bite from deception, exaggeration, or omission rather than from knowing
or reckless falsity. 266
Even if the Code of Judicial Conduct's campaign speech restrictions
survive First Amendment scrutiny, however, that would not address the
problems that arose in the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court election. The offending
advertisements last year were not run by candidates, but by interest groups that
are not subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. 261 The corruption charges
appear to have been independent expenditures, and restrictions on that kind of
spending present different First Amendment concerns.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of restrictions on
independent expenditures in judicial races, but it has expressed considerable
skepticism about such limits in other election campaigns. 2•• For example, in
Buckley v. Va/eo,Z 69 the Court invalidated a $1,000 ceiling on independent
expenditures that explicitly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. 270
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the ceiling was not narrowly
After proceedings in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the state
supreme court about the validity of the restrictions and the commission's procedures. Butler v.
Ala. Judicial InquiryComm'n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (llthCir. 2000). Thecasearoseftoma
tumultuous Republican primary for the party's nomination chief justice. William Glaberson,
States Rein in Truth-Bending in Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,2000, at AI. Justice See's
opponent, who won, was Judge Roy Moore. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
263
Butler, 802 So. 2d at 217-18 (quoting extensively from Butler v. Alabama Judicial
Inquiry Comm'n, Ill F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234-36 (M.D. Ala. 2000)).
264
!d. at 218.
265
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(E).
266
See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
267
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
268
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
269
424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
270
!d. at 42-43.
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tailored to advance the government's compelling interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption.271 Because the restriction applied
only to explicit advocacy concerning the election or defeat of a specific
candidate, it could be evaded by the simple expedient of not using the magic
words calling for the electorate to vote for or against a named individual. m
Moreover, independent expenditures did not "pose dangers of
or apparent
corruption" sufficient to justify regulation. 213 Such spending, if truly
uncoordinated with a favored candidate's campaign, might dilute or even
contradict the candidate's campaign and was less likely to reflect the danger
that the expenditure was part of a quid pro quo, a danger that justified limits on
large contributions directly to candidates.m
The Court reached a similar conclusion on the same reasoning in Federal
Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committe& 75
and Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 276 Io
NCPA C, the Court invalidated a criminal statute that forbade political action
committees from making independent expenditures in excess of $1 ,000 in
support of a presidential candidate who accepted public funding for the
campaign. 277 The restriction on independent expenditures failed to survive
strict scrutiny because there was no risk that such spending would promote
corruption or the appearance of corruption. 278 Accordingly, the restriction was
not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government .interest. 279 In
Massachusetts Citizens for Life the Court held unconstitutional as applied a.
statutory prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for independent
expenditures in federal elections while permitting such expenditures by a
corporation from a separate fund made up of voluntary contributions~ 2 '" The
Court first reiterated that only "express advocacy" supporting or opposing a
particular candidate fell under the definition of independent expenditures. 2' 1 At
the same time; Massachusetts Citizens for Life although chartered as a

real

ld. at 44.
ld. at 45.
273
Jd. at 46.
274
See id. at 47.
275
470 u.s. 480 (1985).
276
479 u.s. 238 (1986).
277
Nat'/ Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 482-83.
278
Jd. at 496-97.
279
ld.
280
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241.
281
Id. at 249. The Court added that the newsletter at issue was "express advocacy": it
exhorted people to vote for prolife candidates and contained the names and photographs of
candidates who fulfilled the organization's criteria in that regard. Id. This was, Justice Brennan
wrote, "in effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates." :That was sufficient,
even though the newsletter did not actually tell readers to vote for any named candidate. ld.
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corporation, was not the sort of large economic entity whose involvement in
elections could pose a risk of corruption or distortion. 282 Accordingly, the ban
on corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures could not validly
apply to that organization. 283
Both of these cases contained language suggesting that prohibitions on
independent expenditures by other corporations might be justifiable. 284 Those
suggestions were vindicated in Austin v. Michigan Chamber ofCommerce,w
which upheld a law prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds for
independent expenditures supporting or opposing any candidate for state office
while pennitting such expenditures from a segregated fund made up of
voluntary contributions. 286 This law differed from the ban on spending
corporate treasury funds in connection with referenda that had been struck
down in First National Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti. 287 The prohibition against
corporate spending in candidate elections was designed to promote the state's
compelling interest in alleviating "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate fonn and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas. ''288 Moreover, the law was "precisely targeted"
to advance this interest by eliminating the corrosive effects of direct corporate
spending while simultaneously pennitting corporations to operate segregated
political funds that could make independent expenditures on behalf of or
against particular candidates. 289
Austin might rest in uneasy tension with Bellotti, but it remains good law.
Taken together, these independent expenditure cases suggest that it could be
exceedingly difficult for states to control spending in judicial elections. Of
course, corporations might have to set up separate political action committees,
but Buckley, NCPA C, and Massachusetts Citizens for Life erect a high barrier
against intrusive restrictions on independent expenditures. Further, limiting
the definition of "independent expenditures" to express advocacy supporting
or opposing a named candidate provides yet another severe obstacle to reining
io vitriolic attacks. None of the controversial anti-R~snick ads, for example,
directly advocated a vote against her or in favor ofher opponent. Accordingly,
whatever the scope ofpennissible restrictions on independent expenditures in
See id. at 263-64.
ld.
284
See id.; Nat'/ Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 490-501.
285
494 u.s. 652 (1990).
286
ld at 654-55.
287
435 U.S. 765 (1978); See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60 (distinguishing the Michigan
regulation because "it ensure[d] that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political
ideas espoused by corporations").
288
ld at 660.
289
[d.
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judicial races, those restrictions might not apply to many obnoxious
statements. 290
There is one last obstacle to consider. Even if independent expenditures
could be limite'd, judicial candidates themselves have been raising more and
more money for their campaigns. 291 This trend will likely continue in the wake
of federal court rulings overturning spending limits in judicial races. In Suster
v. Marshal/, 292 several candidates for common pleas judgeships successfully
challenged the $75,000 limit that the Ohio Supreme Court had promulgated.293
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of that limit because it was not narrowly
tailored to advance the state's at least arguably compelling interests in
preventing judges from being distracted from their duties by the need to
concentrate on fund-raising and in promoting public trust in the judiciary. 294
The Ohio Supreme Court responded by varying the cap based on the
population of the jurisdiction served by each judgeship, with a maximum of
$125,000 for common pleas judgeships in the largest counties. m The district
court concluded that the new limits still ran afoul of the First Amendment
because they were not narrowly tailored to promote any compelling
governmental interest. 296 The increase in the ceiling for larger jurisdictions did
not address the fundamental problem that spending caps were not an effective
means of promoting judicial integrity. 297
In short, restricting what judicial candidates say about themselves or about
their opponents might run afoul of the First Amendment. Even if direct
290
As a matter of fact, this problem has prevented action to compel disclosure, of the
donors who supplied the money used for the anti-Resnick ads. The Ohio Elections
Commission, after changing its mind twice, decided that it lacked jurisdiction over the spots
because they did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate. T.C. Brown,
Officials Won't Review Ads Against Judge, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 5, 2001, at B4; Joe Hallett,
Free Speech Protects Attack Ads, Ruling Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 2001, at A1.
Both state and federal courts have also declined to order disclosure. U.S. Judge Rejects Suit
Over Resnick Attack Ads, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 30, 2002, at B4.
291
Sarah McKenzie, Page Warns of Dangers ofCainpaign Money in State Judicial
Elections, STAR TRIB., Nov 16,2001, at Al3.
292
951 F.Supp.693(N.D.Ohio 1996),affd, 149F.3d523(6thCir.l998).
293
/d. at 696. The Ohio Supreme Court had imposed spending caps on races for other
judicial offices. 149 F.3d at 525 n.l.
294
951 F. Supp. at 699-701. The court refused to enjoin a separate provision forbidding
judicial candidates from using funds raised while campaigning for a nonjudicial office, in large
measure because such funds might well have been raised in circumstances that violate other
legitimate restrictions on judicial candidates' speech. See id. at 703.
295
Susterv. Marshall, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
296
ld. at 1151.
297
/d.
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restrictions on candidate speech pass constitutional muster, the debasing
effects of independent expenditures may still go unaddressed.

N.

BEYOND TINKERING WITH THE RULES

Before giving up in despair, we should consider the lessons of the last
Ohio Supreme Court election must be considered. Millions of dollars were
spent last year, many of them for scurrilous attacks, but Justice Resnick won
by a large margin. 29 ' In fact, the attacks apparently helped her mobilize
support. 299 Many observers believe that the aggressive anti-Resnick campaign
by business groups actually enabled her to win an election that she otherwise
would have losP.. Republicans have dominated Ohio politics lately, and there
was a respectable-:-albeit not airtight-case to be made ~gainst her record. 301
Nor was Ohio the only state where aggressive business advertising failed: the
chief justice of· the Mississippi Supreme Court was defeated despite the
support of corporate and industry groups, although political strategists for
business interests profess themselves satisfied with the overall results. 302
This was not the first time that rhetorical overkill by interest groups
backfired: The National Conservative Political Action Committee, at one time
the scourge of liberals, lost much of its luster with a series of shrill attacks on
the apparently vulnerable Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland in 1982. 303
Things got so bad that his Republican opponent, the purported beneficiary of
those efforts, urged NCP AC to stop because Sarbanes (like Resnick) was using
the attacks to mobilize support for what turned out to be an easy victory. 3,.. No
298
Bradshwa, supra note II; T.C. Brown, Resnick Overcomes Attacks, Wins High Court
Race, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 8, 2000, at AI.
299
E.g., James Bradshaw, Group Begins Campaign ofPro-ResnickAds, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. I, 2000, at C2; Paul Souhrada, Labor Leaders Rally Troops/or Resnick,

COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. I, 2000, at C3.
300
E.g., Brent Larkin, Campaign "Geniuses" Hinder Both Parties, PLAIN DEALER, Nov.
12, 2000, at Gl; A Campaign That Backfired, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 2000, at 812; _A
Landslide, Thanks to the Chamber of Commerce, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 2000, at B I 3.
301
See supra text accompanying notes 80-87, 94-110, and 141-143.
302
Emily Heller, Mixed Results for C ofC, NAT'LL.J., Nov. 20,2000, at AI; see also
Louis Jacobson, Lobbying/or "Justice" in State Courts, 32 NAT'LJ. 3678 (2000).
303
See Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Rethinking Regulation ofIndependent Expenditures by
PACs, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 13, 27 (1984).
304
Alison Muscatine, Hogan Again Denounces NCPAC Ads in Debate with Sarbanes,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1982, at B3.
Crude intervention by outsiders sometimes works, however. Consider the three-way 1970
Senate race in New York. Hoping to defeat Democratic candidate Richard Ottinger, the Nixon
White House dispatched Vice President Spiro Agnew to attack Senator Charles Goodell, a
moderate Republican who had alienated the administration and trailed badly in the polls. The
third candidate was James Buckley, the nominee of the Conservative Party and more in
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one claims that the level of political discourse has improved since then, so it
should not be expected that the failure of the anti-Resnick campaign will
ennoble judicial elections by discouraging similar efforts. lOS
At the same time, Justice Resnick's victory shows how difficult it is to
unseat an incumbent jurist. The examples of Rose Bird and her California
colleagues, David Lanphier, and Penny White resonate in part because they are
so unusual. Indeed, those examples have alerted other potentially vulnerable
judges of the dangers of complacency. Byway of illustration, Justice White's
1996 defeat led Justice Adolpho Birch, the author of the opinion that was used
to devastating effect against White, to began planning his 1998 reelection
campaign early; he managed to win, though with a reduced margin. 306
Regardless of how often interest groups succeed in their efforts, the
increasing coarseness of judicial elections gives incumbent judges reason to
worry that they might be the next target. This in turn increases the hazards to
judicial independence and fuels calls for reforming campaign speech or
replacing judicial elections with some type of appointive system. 307 This article
has tried to show that the problems involved are not likely to get fixed simply
by tinkering with the rules. The law might not be only about politics, but it
certainly is partly about politics. This reality cannot be escaped no matter how
hard it is tried.

sympathy with the administration than either ofthe others. Agnew skewered Goodell so badly
that he gained enough votes at Ottinger's expense from outraged liberals and moderates that
Buckley managed to squeak through to victory. See generally MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1972, at 509-.10, 512-13; JULES WITCOVER, WHITE KNIGHT:
THE RISE OF SPIRO AGNEW 372-80, 387-88, 393-94 {1972); Irving Roshwalb & Leonard
Resnicoff, The Impact ofEndorsements and Publishe{i Polls on the 1970 New York Senatorial
Election, 35 PUB. OP. Q. 410 (1971).
305 For example, the architect ofthe anti-Resnick campaign in Ohio expressed no regrets
and promised more such efforts in future years. Larkin, supra note 300; Paul Souhrada,
Resnick Revels in Getting the Last Laugh, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 2000, at D 1. Interest
groups have been gearing up for what might be an even more costly judicial election in 2002.
David Bennett, Courtin the Balance, CRAIN'S CLEV. Bus., Jan. 28, 2002, at I.
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Reid, supra note 6, at 74-75.
307 See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 3.

